Most of the recommendations presented in this report can be implemented by individual countries – or by the cities, states, regions and businesses within them. Much of what needs to be done to achieve better growth and a better climate is in these actors’ economic self-interest even if comparable action is not occurring elsewhere.
Still, an international agreement on climate change is vital, for several reasons.
First, the more action is taken globally, the easier it is to win political support for action at home. Climate change mitigation requires collective action; greenhouse gas molecules have the same effect wherever their origin, and no single country (or small group of countries) can slow the processes of warming alone. Thus, it is easy to resist climate action by asking, “What difference can our contribution make if other countries are not acting?” The greater the collective effort, the easier it is for political and business decision-makers to justify the effort and costs required for actions at home. (This is discussed further in Chapter 5: Economics of Change.)
Second, the wider the international field of low-carbon policies, the less likely they are to affect business competitiveness. When firms face different climate policies in different jurisdictions, there is always a risk that those facing more stringent regulations or higher carbon prices might lose market share, or even seek to move to areas with weaker policies.
Third, an international agreement is needed to strengthen the climate finance flows, technology transfer and capacity-building that developing countries need to implement low-carbon strategies and adapt to climate change. Even where measures are economically beneficial, they are often not affordable, particularly when their upfront costs exceed those of equivalent but higher-carbon investments.
Fourth, as the report has argued, actions and policies with net economic benefits are unlikely to be sufficient to keep the average global temperature increase under 2°C. Other measures will be required whose sole or primary purpose is to combat climate change, such as deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) or early retirement of coal power plants. These will be much more feasible in the context of a global agreement to tackle climate change.
A new legal agreement is thus essential to drive the investment and innovation in low-carbon, climate-resilient growth at a sufficient scale to reduce the risk of dangerous climate change. Such an agreement is currently being negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as a successor, or supplement, to the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997.7 That agreement had been the subject of considerable controversy. The United States refused to ratify it because it did not require binding emission reduction commitments from major developing economies. The US withdrawal, in turn, discouraged stronger action by those countries. The emission reduction targets for the first Kyoto commitment period, which amounted to just a 5.2% reduction by 2012 from 1990 levels, were also clearly inadequate to the growing scale of the climate problem.8 The commitments have also proven difficult to enforce, as became evident when Canada, which was not on track to meet its target, withdrew in late 2011 and thus avoided any penalties. 9
Negotiations to achieve a new international agreement have not been easy. Hopes that a new legally binding agreement might be secured at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009 were not fulfilled. The conference ended with only partial agreement, and amid considerable acrimony. 10 The following year, in Cancun, Mexico, a UN agreement was reached, under which countries made pledges to reduce their emissions trajectories and to provide financial support to developing countries, but it was not legally binding.11
This experience has led some commentators, businesses and others to question whether a global legal agreement is either possible or necessary. Some have argued that, since the vast majority of global emissions come from a relatively small group of countries, it might be better to shift international efforts away from the often tortuous negotiations of the UN, where all countries have to agree, to smaller forums of the major emitting countries, such as the G20. 12
But this analysis underestimates both the importance of a global agreement and the viability of the UNFCCC negotiations. Even if only a few countries are major GHG emitters, the impacts of climate change affect all – particularly some of the smallest and least developed countries, including small island states whose very survival is threatened by sea-level rise. 13 An agreement reached without these countries at the table would be neither fair nor legitimate. At the 2011 UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, countries laid the groundwork for negotiating a new legal agreement to come into effect in 2020. 14 The agreement is expected to be finalised and approved at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015.
An international agreement cannot force countries to tackle climate change. They will act of their own volition, through domestic political and policy processes. This is recognised in the ongoing negotiations, which have agreed that each country should submit its “intended nationally determined contributions”. 15 What an agreement can provide is the global framework that facilitates stronger action by all countries simultaneously. Only strong and simultaneous action will make it possible to keep global warming under 2°C.
Countries need to feel confident that all are doing their fair share, so it is important that the new agreement be equitable. Climate change embodies a form of injustice: it has been overwhelmingly caused by the historical emissions of the now developed countries, 16 but its impacts will hit some of the poorest, lowest-emitting countries the hardest. A majority of the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere today were emitted by the developed economies. Yet developing countries’ emissions now exceed those of high-income countries, driven primarily by fast-growing upper-middle-income economies, and their share is increasing. 17 Slowing emissions in developing countries is thus essential to avoiding dangerous climate change. The question is how to do this fairly, as these countries still have significant populations living in poverty, and they rightfully wish to continue developing their economies. Most also have much lower per capita emissions than developed countries. 18
For these reasons the perceived fairness of an international agreement matters. In practice, what this means is that, while both developing and developed countries will have to take serious action, developed countries will have to make earlier and deeper absolute cuts to their own emissions, on a path to near-complete decarbonisation of their economies by mid-century. They will need to provide strong examples of how good policy can drive economic growth and climate risk reduction together; develop and disseminate new technologies; share know-how, including through collaborative ventures; strengthen funding sources and financial institutions to bring down the cost of capital; and provide climate finance to developing countries for adaptation, mitigation and capacity-building.
By providing a core framework of multilateral rules, an international legal agreement on climate change would represent a strong form of global governance. But an even more important goal is economic. The ultimate purpose of an international agreement should be to drive investment into low-carbon and climate-resilient growth and development.
One of the key observations of this report, as argued in particular in Chapter 5: Economics of Change, is the importance of expectations in determining the level and direction of investment and consumption. Uncertainty weakens both. Yet it is uncertainty which currently characterises low-carbon policy in many countries. Businesses and investors frequently have little confidence that government targets will be met or policies sustained. Weak and inconsistent policies send mixed signals about governments’ own commitments, creating “policy risk” which raises the cost of capital. The result is lower investment overall, and the now-familiar strategy of investors hedging their bets between high- and low-carbon assets.
An international agreement cannot in itself give confidence in the policies of specific countries – that comes from the credibility of domestic action. But it could send a powerful overall signal on the future direction of the global economy. A strong agreement in which all countries commit to a low-carbon future could significantly change business and investor expectations about the relative returns on low- and high-carbon investments. It would indicate to the suppliers of low-carbon goods and services that their markets are going to grow, not just in individual countries, but throughout the world. The stronger the agreement’s legal form, and the longer-term its commitments, the greater the confidence generated that low-carbon policies are likely to endure, and not be reversed.
For these reasons a strong international agreement has the potential to act as a powerful macroeconomic policy instrument, sending clear signals to businesses and investors about the future low-carbon direction of the global economy.
The 2015 agreement looks likely to combine a set of common rules and norms, internationally agreed, with “intended nationally determined contributions” submitted by each participating country. These contributions will be decided through domestic political and economic policy-making processes, which has the important advantage of grounding the agreement in national realities. But it also carries the evident risk that the contributions will not add up to a collective effort sufficient to put the world on track to meet the agreed 2°C goal. There has therefore been discussion of potential processes to compare intended contributions with one another and against the 2°C goal, to encourage further effort. 19
What are not likely are negotiations which seek to divide up a global GHG budget among the different countries. But if it is recognised, as this report shows, that prosperity and a low-carbon future can go together, climate negotiations should not be a competition for the right to emit as much as possible. Some countries, especially those with ample fossil fuel resources, will unquestionably find it challenging to make the low-carbon transition. But the incentives should not be to maximise each country’s “carbon allowance”. Instead, the aim of the new agreement should be to help all countries seize the opportunity to improve their growth prospects and living standards while reducing their dependence on emissions-generating activities.
It is not the Commission’s place to recommend the detailed components of a new agreement. From an economic standpoint, however, there are several features which would greatly enhance its ability to send a clear signal to businesses, investors and governments on the future low-carbon character of the global economy.
First, it is important that the agreement establish a clear long-term direction. A good way to do this is to include a long-term goal. Countries have agreed to the goal of keeping global warming below 2°C, but while this is valuable, it is unclear what it means for actual emissions. One idea which has gained some attention recently is that the long-term goal should be to phase out net greenhouse gas emissions altogether. 20 (“Net” emissions allows for the fact that increasing the stock of forests and other natural “sinks” and using effective carbon capture technologies could compensate for some level of emissions, and even potentially generate “negative emissions”.)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that for a two-thirds or better chance of holding warming to 2°C, GHG emissions will need to fall to near-zero or below in the second half of the century. 21 A world of no net emissions (sometimes described as “carbon neutrality”) sounds radical today, but within 40–50 years, technological innovation is very likely to make it achievable – even likelier if governments adopt the goal and incentivise its achievement. 22 One only needs to compare today’s technologies with those of the 1960s and 70s to appreciate this. Adoption of a long-term goal of this kind within an international agreement would send a powerful economic signal about the direction of the future global economy.
Second, the agreement should aim to establish a predictable and synchronised process of national policy-making. Under a five-year cycle of international negotiations, for example, countries would set targets for 5–10 years ahead (in 2015 this would be for 2020–2025), with an indicative, revisable target for a further five years. A specific requirement that emissions targets must be progressively tightened would be particularly helpful. The degree of tightening would need to be determined by each country on its five-year cycle, but the principle would ensure clarity of direction. A combination of firm five-year commitments, plus indicative 10-year targets aiming for the long-term goal, would provide appropriate time frames for action and planning across sectors and governments.
For major economies, the agreement might go further, obliging or encouraging governments to publish long-term economic development and growth strategies outlining how they plan to move in a long-term low-carbon and climate-resilient direction. Such strategies – and the underlying political and policy-making processes – would greatly help businesses, investors and the wider public to understand and debate the possibilities, benefits and costs of the low-carbon transition. Guidance for such strategies could include encouragement of carbon pricing (including the removal of fossil fuel subsidies), along with strategies to shift towards low-carbon energy and low-carbon policies in transport, urban development, agriculture, forests and other sectors.
Third, an agreement should strengthen countries’ incentives and capacities to adapt to climate change and to reduce their vulnerability. In particular, it could encourage all parties to develop and implement national adaptation plans. These should incorporate action by sub-national governments and municipalities, and set out the requirements on businesses and others to understand and take action to address climate risks. It should incentivise regional collaboration to support adaptation planning, given shared exposure to some climate risks and the benefits of pooling resources for climate change research and information systems. Adaptation plans will benefit from including a diverse set of government agencies, alongside business, academia and civil society, and can provide a vehicle for international financial and technological support.
Fourth, it is important that an agreement establishes common accounting and reporting rules on the commitments countries make, and their progress towards achieving them. International confidence in the agreement, and in the national actions which follow it, will be undermined if there is doubt about whether claimed emissions reductions are accurate or credible. Transparency and clear verification processes are therefore vital.
Last, a new international agreement should provide a framework for increased financial flows into low-carbon and climate-resilient investment and development. This should include the obligations of the richest countries to provide support to developing countries, and mechanisms designed to facilitate increased flows of private-sector finance. It should also include provisions to enhance the development and dissemination of low-carbon technologies, and those which can improve climate resilience. These are discussed further in the following section.
An international agreement will contain many other provisions; this is by no means a comprehensive description. But an agreement which included these elements would provide a major boost to international economic confidence.